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(57) ABSTRACT 
Mechanisms for operating a prover device and a verifier 
device so that the verifier device can verify the authenticity 
of the prover device. The prover device generates a data 
string by: (a) submitting a challenge to a physical unclonable 
function (PUF) to obtain a response string, (b) selecting a 
substring from the response string, ( c) injecting the selected 
substring into the data string, and ( d) injecting random bits 
into bit positions of the data string not assigned to the 
selected substring. The verifier: ( e) generates an estimated 
response string by evaluating a computational model of the 
PUF based on the challenge; (f) performs a search process 
to identify the selected substring within the data string using 
the estimated response string; and (g) determines whether 
the prover device is authentic based on a measure of 
similarity between the identified substring and a correspond-
ing substring of the estimated response string. 
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PUF AUTHENTICATION AND 
KEY-EXCHANGE BY SUBSTRING 
MATCHING 
GOVERNMENT RIGHTS IN INVENTION 
This invention was made with govermnent support under 
Grant No. CNS-0644289, awarded by the National Science 
Foundation; and under U.S. Army Research Office Grant 
No. W911NF-11-l-0474, awarded by the U.S. Department 10 
of Defense, and U.S. Navy Grant No. N00014-11-l-0885, 
also awarded by the U.S. Department of Defense. The 
govermnent has certain rights in the invention. 
2 
being able to recover that information, even when they have 
access to communications between the source and destina-
tion. 
SUMMARY 
In one set of embodiments, a prover device may perform 
the following method to enable a remote verifier device to 
authenticate the prover device. 
The prover device may generating a data string by: (a) 
submitting a challenge to a physical unclonable function to 
obtain a response string, (b) selecting a substring of prede-
termined length from the response string, ( c) injecting the 
selected substring into the data string, and (d) injecting 
FIELD OF THE INVENTION 
The present invention relates to the field of cryptography, 
and more particularly, to mechanisms for performing 
authentication and key exchange in a mamier that is robust 
and immune to reverse-engineering attacks. 
15 random bits into bit positions of the data string not assigned 
to the selected substring. The prover device may transmit the 
data string to the second device through a communication 
medium. 
The position of the selected substring within the response 
DESCRIPTION OF THE RELATED ART 
20 string and the position of selected substring within the data 
string are secrets, not revealed by the prover device. Thus, 
the prover device makes it very difficult for an attacker to 
model the physical unclonable function from observations of 
A prover desires to prove its authenticity to a verifier, and 
to that end, sends authentication information to the verifier. 25 
The verifier examines the authentication information, and 
verifies or rejects the authenticity of the prover based on the 
authentication information. The prover may use (and may 
include) a physical unclonable function (PUF) to generate 
the authentication information, e.g., as described in: 30 
the transmitted data string. 
In some embodiments, the action of selecting a substring 
of predetermined length from the response string may 
include randomly selecting a number, where a start position 
of the substring within the response string is determined by 
the randomly selected number. 
In some embodiments, the action of selecting a substring 
of predetermined length from the response string may 
include determining a number by encoding a non-empty 
subset of bits from a key, where a start position of the 
substring within the response string is determined by the 
"Slender PUF Protocol: A Lightweight, Robust, and 
Secure Authentication by Substring Matching", by 
Mehrdad Majzoobi, Masoud Rostami, Farinaz Koush-
anfar, Dan S. Wallach, Srinivas Devadas, IEEE CS 
Security and Privacy Workshops, 24-25 May 2012. 35 number. 
A PUF is a hardware device that receives a challenge 
(vector of input bits) and produces a response (a vector of 
output bits), where the space of possible challenges and the 
space of possible responses are vast, where the relationship 
between challenge and response is complicated and unique 40 
to the individual hardware device. 
In some embodiments, the action of generating the data 
string may include randomly selecting a number, where the 
number determines a start position of the selected substring 
within the data string. 
In some embodiments, the action of generating the data 
string may include determining a number by encoding a 
non-empty subset of bits from a key, where a start position 
of the selected substring within the data string is determined 
by the number. 
The prover submits a challenge to the PUF, receives the 
response from the PUF, and selects a substring of predeter-
mined length from the response. The prover then transmits 
the selected substring to the verifier. However, the prover 45 
does not reveal the position of the substring with the 
In one set of embodiments, a method for operating a 
verifier device to verify the authenticity of a communicating 
party may include the following operations. response. 
The verifier receives the selected substring and matches 
the selected substring to a substring of a simulated PUF 
response. The verifier generates the simulated PUF response 
by evaluating a model of the PUF on the challenge, i.e., the 
same challenge used by the prover. If the selected substring 
and the matching substring of the simulated PUF response 
are sufficiently close, the verifier declares the prover to be 
authentic. 
The above-described mechanism of authentication makes 
its difficult for an attacker to accurately model the PUF 
based on observations of the transmitted substrings. (If the 
attacker were able to accurately model the PUF, it could pose 
as a prover, and gain authentication by submitting a selected 
substring of a response produced from its model.) However, 
due to the ever-increasing compute power available to 
attackers, there is a strong incentive to provide ever-increas-
ing levels of authentication security. Thus, improved PUF-
based authentication mechanisms are desired. Furthermore, 
it is generally desirable to transmit secret information (such 
as keys) from a source to a destination without third parties 
The verifier device may receive a data string from the 
communicating party, where the data string is generated by 
50 the communicating party by (a) submitting a challenge to a 
physical unclonable function to obtain a response string, (b) 
selecting a substring of predetermined length from the 
response string, ( c) injecting the selected substring into the 
data string, and (d) injecting random bits into bit positions 
55 of the data string not assigned to the selected substring. 
The verifier device may generate an estimated response 
string by evaluating a computational model of the physical 
unclonable function based on the challenge. The computa-
tional model may be evaluated in software and/or hardware. 
60 The parameters of the computational model are maintained 
as a secret by the verifier device. 
The verifier device may perform a search process to 
identify the selected substring within the data string using 
the estimated response string, e.g., by executing a string 
65 alignment algorithm. 
The verifier device may determine whether the commu-
nicating party is authentic based on a measure of similarity 
US 9,628,272 B2 
3 
(such as Hamming distance) between the identified selected 
substring and a corresponding substring of the estimated 
response string. 
4 
substring W of a predefined length. Bottom: padding the 
substring W with random bits. 
FIG. 68 illustrates an embodiment of a process by which 
the Verifier matches the received padded substring (PW) In some embodiments, the action of selecting a substring 
of predetermined length from the response string may 
include randomly selecting a number, where a start position 
of the substring within the response string is determined by 
the randomly selected number. 
In some embodiments, the action of selecting a substring 
5 against his simulated PUF response R', assuming that the 
substring W occurs within the padded substring PW as one 
contiguous whole, i.e., without circular wrapping. The 
authentication is deemed to be successful if the Hamming 
distance between the received substring Wand the simulated 
10 substring is lower than a predefined threshold value. of predetermined length from the response string may 
include determining a number by encoding a non-empty 
subset of bits from a key, where a start position of the 
substring within the response string is determined by the 
number. The search process provides an estimate of the 15 
number. Thus, the verifier device may recover the non-
empty subset of bits of the key from the estimate of the 
number. 
In some embodiments, the action of generating the data 
string may include randomly selecting a number, where the 20 
number determines a start position of the selected substring 
within the data string. 
In some embodiments, the action of generating the data 
string may include determining a number by encoding a 
non-empty subset of bits from a key, where a start position 25 
of the selected substring within the data string is determined 
by the number. The search process provides an estimate of 
the number. Thus, the verifier device may recover the 
non-empty subset of bits of the key from the estimate of the 
number. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
30 
FIG. 7 illustrates the modeling error rate for an arbiter-
based PUF, and XOR PUFs with 2 and 3 outputs as a 
function of number of train/test CRPs, according to one set 
of embodiments. 
FIG. 8 illustrates resource usage on the Prover side and 
the Verifier side, according to one embodiment. 
FIG. 9 illustrates one embodiment of a true random 
number generation architecture, based on flipflop metasta-
bility. 
FIG. 10 illustrates one embodiment of a method for 
operating a verifier device to verify the authenticity of a 
communicating party. 
FIG. 11 illustrates one embodiment of a system 1100 for 
verifying authenticity of a communicating party. 
FIG. 12 illustrates one embodiment of a method for 
operating a prover device so that a verifier device is enabled 
to authenticate the prover device. 
FIG. 13 illustrates one embodiment of a prover system 
1300. 
While the invention is susceptible to various modifica-
tions and alternative forms, specific embodiments thereof 
are shown by way of example in the drawings and are herein 
described in detail. It should be understood, however, that 
the drawings and detailed description thereto are not A better understanding of the present invention can be 
obtained when the following detailed description of the 
preferred embodiments is considered in conjunction with the 
following drawings. 
FIG. 1 illustrates a verifier and prover communicating via 
35 intended to limit the invention to the particular form dis-
closed, but on the contrary, the intention is to cover all 
modifications, equivalents and alternatives falling within the 
spirit and scope of the present invention as defined by the 
appended claims. a communication medium. The prover is interested in being 
authenticated by the verifier, and thus, sends information to 40 
the verifier in order to prove itself to the verifier. The verifier 
is responsible for verifying the authenticity of the prover. 
FIG. 2 shows one embodiment of an arbiter linear PUF 
block with an N-component challenge vector and one 
response bit. The arbiter converts the analog delay difference 45 
between the two paths to a digital value. 
FIG. 3 illustrates one embodiment of a system comprising 
two independent linear arbiter PUFs whose outputs are 
XOR-mixed in order to implement an arbiter PUF with 
better statistical properties. The challenge sequence in the 50 
second stage is applied in the reverse order (relative to the 
application order in the first stage) to help achieve this 
property. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE 
PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS 
Terminology 
A memory medium is a non-transitory medium config-
ured for the storage and retrieval of information. Examples 
of memory media include: semiconductor-based memory 
such as various kinds of RAM and ROM; various kinds of 
magnetic media such as magnetic disk, tape, strip and film; 
various kinds of optical media such as CD-ROM and 
DVD-ROM; various media based on the storage of electrical 
charge and/or any of a wide variety of other physical 
quantities; media fabricated using various lithographic tech-FIG. 4 shows one embodiment of a method for executing 
a PUP-based authentication protocol. 
FIG. SA illustrates an example of the circular extraction 
of a substring W of length Lsub =5 from a response string R 
of length L=24. 
55 niques; etc. The term "memory medium" includes within its 
scope of meaning the possibility that a given memory 
medium might be a union of two or more memory media that 
reside at different locations, e.g., on different chips on a 
FIG. SB illustrates an example of the circular padding of 
the extracted substring W with random bits to form a padded 60 
substring PW of length Lpw=24. 
FIG. 6Aillustrates an embodiment of the substring extrac-
tion and padding steps performed by the Prover, where the 
substring Wis injected into the padded substring PW as one 
contiguous whole, i.e., without allowing the substring W to 65 
circularly wrap within the padded substring. Top: random 
selection of an index value ind1 . Middle: extracting a 
circuit board or on different computers in a network. 
A computer-readable memory medium may be configured 
so that it stores program instructions and/or data, where the 
program instructions, if executed by a computer system, 
cause the computer system to perform a method, e.g., any of 
the method embodiments described herein, or, any combi-
nation of the method embodiments described herein, or, any 
subset of any of the method embodiments described herein, 
or, any combination of such subsets. 
US 9,628,272 B2 
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A computer system is any device ( or combination of 
devices) having at least one processor that is configured to 
execute program instructions stored on a memory medium. 
Examples of computer systems include personal computers 
(PCs), workstations, laptop computers, tablet computers, 5 
mainframe computers, server computers, client computers, 
network or Internet appliances, hand-held devices, mobile 
devices, personal digital assistants (PDAs), computer-based 
television systems, grid computing systems, wearable com-
puters, computers implanted in living organisms, computers 10 
embedded in head-mounted displays, computers embedded 
in sensors of a distributed network, computers embedded in 
a smart card, etc. 
A programmable hardware element (PHE) is a hardware 15 
device that includes multiple progrannnable function blocks 
connected via a system of programmable interconnects. 
Examples of PHEs include FPGAs (Field Programmable 
Gate Arrays), PLDs (Programmable Logic Devices), FPO As 
(Field Progrannnable Object Arrays), and CPLDs (Complex 20 
PLDs). The programmable function blocks may range from 
fine grained ( combinatorial logic or look up tables) to coarse 
grained (arithmetic logic units or processor cores). 
In some embodiments, a computer system may be con-
figured to include a processor ( or a set of processors) and a 25 
memory medium, where the memory medium stores pro-
gram instructions, where the processor is configured to read 
and execute the program instructions stored in the memory 
medium, where the program instructions are executable by 
the processor to implement a method, e.g., any of the various 30 
method embodiments described herein, or, any combination 
of the method embodiments described herein, or, any subset 
of any of the method embodiments described herein, or, any 
6 
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tation. The low overhead and practicality of the protocols are 
evaluated and confirmed by hardware implementation. 
FIG. 1 shows a verifier 110 and a prover 130 that 
communicate via a communication medium 120. The com-
5 munication medium 120 may include any desired physical 
medium or combination of physical media. For example, the 
communication medium may include one or more of the 
following: the atmosphere or free space, a body of water 
such as an expanse of sea or ocean, a fiber optic channel, a 
wired channel or cable connection, a portion of the earth's 
10 
subsurface. In some embodiments, the communication 
medium 120 may be a computer network such as the 
Internet. The verifier and the prover may be configured to 
communicate information over the communication medium 
120 in any of a wide variety of conventional ways. For 
15 example, the verifier and prover may each be configured to 
transmit and receive one or more of the following types of 
signals: electrical signals, electromagnetic signals (such as 
radio signals, infrared signals, visible light signals or ultra-
violet signals), acoustic signals, mechanical signals such as 
20 displacement, velocity or acceleration signals, chemical 
signals or chemical gradient signals, electrochemical signals 
propagating along neurons, thermal signals, etc. 
In some embodiments, the prover 130 is operated by a 
person or entity that desires access to products and/or 
25 services provided by a business. The business may use the 
verifier 110 in order to authenticate the prover 130 (or person 
operating the prover) as having legitimate access to the 
products and/or services. 
In some embodiments, the prover 130 is operated by a 
30 person or an entity that desires access to information main-
tained by a business or governmental agency. The business 
or governmental agency may operate the verifier 110 in 
order to verify that the prover 130 (or person operating the 
[35] B. Sunar, W. Martin, and D. Stinson, "A provably 
secure true random number generator with built-in taler- 35 
ance to active attacks," Computers, IEEE Transactions on, 
vol. 56, no. 1, pp. 109-119, 2007. 
prover) has authority to access the information. 
In some embodiments, the prover 130 is operated by a 
business or governmental agency that desires to prove its 
authenticity to a person (or other entity). The person (or 
other entity) may use the verifier 110 in order to authenticate 
the business or governmental agency. 
[36] M. Kim, J. Ryou, and S. Jun, "Efficient hardware 
architecture of SHA-256 algorithm for trusted mobile 
computing," in Information Security and Cryptology, 40 
2009, pp. 240-252. 
In some embodiments, the prover 130 may be a mobile 
device (such as a cell phone or media player or tablet 
computer) that is interested in authenticating itself with a 
wireless network or a service provider. In this case, the 
communication medium 120 may include a wireless con-
[37] S. Drimer, T. Guneysu, and C. Paar, "DSPs, BRAMS, 
and a pinch of logic: Extended recipes for AES on 
FPGAs," ACM Trans. on Reconfigurable Technology and 
Systems, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 3, 2010. 
PUF Authentication and Key-Exchange by Substring 
Matching 
45 nection with a wireless communication network, and the 
verifier 110 may be a computer operated by the wireless 
network or the service provider. 
In some embodiments, the communication medium 120 is 
(or includes) a physical object or entity that passed or 
50 transported from the prover 130 to the verifier 110. For 
example, the prover 130 may write or record information 
(such as the padded substring PW described herein) on the 
physical object, and the verifier 110 may read the informa-
tion from the physical object. The physical object may 
In this patent document, we disclose ( among other things) 
robust and low-overhead Physical Unclonable Function 
(PUF) authentication and key exchange protocols that are 
resilient against reverse-engineering attacks. The protocols 
are executed between a party (the Prover) with access to a 
physical PUF and a trusted party (the Verifier) who has 
access to the PUF compact model. The presently-disclosed 
protocols do not follow the classic paradigm of exposing the 
full PUF responses or a transformation of them. Instead, 
random subsets of PUF response strings are sent to the 
Verifier. So the exact position of the subset is obfuscated for 
the third-party channel observers. Authentication of the 
responses at the Verifier side is done by matching the 
substring to the available full response string; the index of 
the matching point is the actual obfuscated secret (or key) 
and not the response substring itself. We perform a thorough 
analysis of resiliency of the protocols against various adver-
sarial acts, including machine learning and statistical 65 
attacks. The attack analysis guides us in tuning the param-
eters of the protocol for an efficient and secure implemen-
55 include memory to support the storage of the information. 
The examples given above are just a few of the practically 
infinite range of possible applications of the presently dis-
closed methods, and are not meant to be limiting. 
In some embodiments, the communication medium 120 is 
60 an insecure medium, where third parties are able to access 
some or all communications transmitted onto the commu-
nication medium. 
I. Introduction 
Classic security paradigms rely on a stored digital secret 
key and cryptographic algorithms. Secret keys are stored in 
US 9,628,272 B2 
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access to the full string, can perform a substring matching, 
and thereby discover the secret index. The matched strings 
may not be the same, but as long as they are within a small 
distance of each other (as defined by a threshold), the 
an on-chip non-volatile memory (NVM). However, on-chip 
NVM storage is prone to invasive physical attacks (e.g., 
probing) and non-invasive imaging attacks (e.g., by scan-
ning electron microscopes). Moreover, correct implementa-
tion of security algorithms based on a pre-distributed secret 
key requires Password-Authenticated Key Exchange 
(PAKE) protocols. These protocols are provably secure; 
however, they require costly exponentiation operations [1], 
[2]. Therefore, they are not suitable for many low power 
resource-intensive applications. 
5 matching is declared to be successful. Therefore, the method 
is inherently robust to the noise in the PUF responses, 
eliminating the need for costly error correction or fuzzy 
extraction. 
The protocol may be devised such that the Verifier and the 
10 Prover jointly generate the challenges to the PUF. The 
challenges may be generated in a way that neither a dishon-
est Prover nor a dishonest Verifier can solely control the 
challenges used for authentication. While none of the 
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) have been pro-
posed [3] to provide a desired level of security with low 
implementation overhead. One type of PUF is based on 
silicon, and is designed to bind secrets to silicon hardware 
[4]. Silicon PUFs use the unclonable intrinsic process vari- 15 
ability of silicon devices to provide a unique mapping from 
a set of digital inputs (challenges) to a set of digital outputs 
(responses). The imperfections and uncertainties in the fab-
rication technology make cloning of a hardware circuit with 
the exact same device characteristics impossible, hence the 20 
term unclonable. Moreover, PUFs must be designed to make 
it prohibitively hard to simulate, emulate, or predict their 
behavior [4]. Excellent surveys of various PUF designs can 
be found in [5]-[7]. 
Strong PUFs are a class of PUFs which have the property 25 
that the number of their possible challenge-response pairs 
(CRPs) has an exponential relationship with respect to the 
number of their physical components. This huge space of 
possible CRPs hinders attacks based on pre-recording and 
re-playing previously used CRPs. However, physical com- 30 
ponents of a Strong PUF are finite. Therefore, given access 
to these components, a compact polynomial-order model of 
the CRP relationships can be built. 
A trusted intellectual property owner with physical access 
to the device (e.g., the original manufacturer) can build such 35 
a compact model by measuring the direct responses of the 
PUF. Such compact models can be treated as a secret which 
can be used by a trusted Verifier to authenticate the Prover's 
PUF. (Physical access to these components may be perma-
nently disabled before field deployment to avoid direct 40 
compact modeling.) An unfortunate fact is that third party 
observers may also be able to model the PUF based on a 
finite number of CRPs exchanged on the communication 
channel as has been done before. See, e.g., [8]. This type of 
PUF modeling by untrusted third parties is also called a 45 
machine-learning or reverse-engineering attack, as it harms 
the PUF security. Such attacks were possible because the 
challenge and response strings leak structural information 
about the PUF and compact models. 
In this patent disclosure, we describe (among other 50 
things) secure, low overhead, and robust authentication and 
key exchange protocols (e.g., for Strong PUFs) that thwart 
machine-learning attacks. The protocols enable a Prover 
with physical access to the PUF to authenticate itself to a 
trusted Verifier. It is assumed that the trusted Verifier has 55 
access to the secret compact PUF model. The protocol leaks 
a minimal amount of information about secret PUF param-
eters on the communication channel. This is because the 
secret is the index of a response substring, which is selected 
(e.g., randomly) from the full response string. The Prover 60 
also adds random padding strings before and after the 
response substring. The indices (i.e., lengths) of the padding 
strings are also a part of the secret. 
In some embodiments, only the padded substring is sent 
on the channel. Since the indices are not correlated with the 65 
substring content in any way, the secret itself is never 
exposed on the communication channel. The Verifier, with 
authenticating parties can solely control the challenges, the 
resulting challenge values are publicly known. The authen-
tication protocol, described above, can also be leveraged to 
implement a low-power and secure key-exchange algorithm. 
The Prover only needs to select a key ( e.g., a random 
password) and then encode it as a set of secret indices to be 
used in the authentication protocol. 
We provide a thorough discussion of the complexity and 
effectiveness of attacks on the presently-disclosed protocols. 
The protocols are designed to achieve robustness against 
inherent noise in PUF response bits, without costly tradi-
tional error-correction modules. We demonstrate that our 
protocols can be implemented with a few simple modules on 
the Prover side. Therefore, we do not need expensive 
cryptographic hashing and classic error-correction tech-
niques that have been suggested in earlier literature for 
achieving security. Note that recent work has used pattern 
matching for correcting errors while generating secret keys 
from a PUF [9]. However, unlike the presently-disclosed 
key-exchange protocol, the number of generated secret keys 
was limited. In addition, a higher level of protection against 
machine learning attacks can be achieved by the presently-
disclosed protocols. 
We have published a paper [10] on PUP-based authenti-
cation. That paper only discussed the application of PUFs 
for robust and attack-resilient authentication and did not 
propose a key exchange protocol based on PUFs. The 
proposed authentication protocol in [10] achieves a lower 
level of security than the protocol disclosed in this patent. 
This is because we also add random padding to the PUF 
substring, which generates a larger number of secret indices. 
In brief, some of the new contributions of the present 
patent disclosure are as follows: 
(a) We introduce and analyze two lightweight and secure 
protocols based on substring-matching of PUF response 
strings to perform authentication and session key exchange. 
(b) The protocols automatically provide robustness 
against inherent noise in the PUF response string, without 
requiring externally added and costly traditional error-cor-
rection modules or fuzzy extraction. 
( c) We perform a thorough analysis of the resiliency of 
protocols against a host of attacks. 
( d) Our analyses provide guidelines for setting the pro-
tocol parameters for robust and low-overhead operation. 
( e) The lightweight nature, security and practicality of the 
new protocol are confirmed by a set of hardware implemen-
tation and evaluations. 
If the reader is familiar with PUF circuits and its related 
literature, he/she may now jump to Section IV. 
II. Background on Strong Pufs 
In this section, without loss of generality, we introduce a 
popular instance of Strong PUF known as arbiter PUF or 
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delay-based PUF. Desired statistical properties of a Strong 
PUF are briefly reviewed, and XOR mixing of arbiter PUFs 
to improve the statistical properties is discussed. Note the 
presently-disclosed protocol may be used with any desired 
PUF. However, it is generally preferable for the PUF to be 5 
Strong PUF that satisfies the requirements discussed in this 
section. 
A. Strong PUFs and their Implementation 
There are a number of different PUF types, each with a set 
12 
According to expression 1 B, if the path delay difference 
is greater than zero, then the response will be '1 '; otherwise 
the response is 'O'. To simplify the notations, expressions IA 
and lB, can be rewritten as: 
r~Sign(!:.·<l>), (3) 
where 
£l.=[01,02, · · ·, ON+ll 
is the delay parameter vector, where 
<P=[(-])P1, (-])P', ... , (-])PH, ]]=[cp1, <P2, · · ·, <PN+ll 
is the transformed challenge vector, in which cp,E{l,-1}, 
where "•" is the dot product operator, and Sign is the sign 
function. We will refer to C as the input challenge vector in 
the remainder of the disclosure. Note that the parameters <I>, 
of unique properties and applications. For example, Weak 10 
PUFs, also known as Physically Obfuscated Keys (POKs) 
are commonly used for key generation applications. The 
other type is called Strong PUF [11]. Strong PUFs are built 
based on the unclonable disorder in the physical device 
features, with very many challenge-response pairs. The size 
15 p, and C are related to each other. 
B. Linear Arbiter PUF Statistical Properties 
of the CRP space is an exponential function of the number 
of underlying components. Strong PUFs have the property 
that they are prohibitively hard to clone; a complete enu-
meration of all their CRPs is intractable. To be secure, they 
should be resilient to machine learning and prediction 
attacks. 
In this subsection, the statistical properties of a linear 
arbiter PUF are reviewed. It has been demonstrated in [14] 
that when the delay parameters 111Eli. come from identical 
20 symmetric distributions with zero mean (in particular it is 
In some embodiments of the presently-disclosed proto-
cols, we use a Strong PUF implementation called "delay-
based arbiter PUF" introduced in [ 12]. In this PUF, the delay 25 
difference between two parallel paths is compared. The 
paths are built identically to make their nominal delays equal 
by design. However, the delay of fabricated paths on chips 
will be different due to process variations. See FIG. 2. A step 
input 202 simultaneously triggers the two paths. At the end 30 
of the two parallel (racing) paths, an arbiter 212 (typically a 
D-Flip Flop) is used to convert the analog difference 
between the paths to a digital value. The arbiter output (i.e., 
the response bit) is one if the signal arrives at its first input 
earlier than the second input; otherwise, it stays at zero. The 35 
two paths are divided into several smaller sub-paths by 
inserting path-swapping switches SW 1 through SW N Each 
set of inputs { C,} to the switches acts as a challenge set 
( denoted by vector C). Each switch has two inputs and two 
outputs, and couples the inputs to the outputs in either an 40 
identity configuration (INa-OUTa and IN1-0UT1) or a 
crossover configuration (INa-OUT1 and IN1-0UTa), 
depending on the current value of the corresponding chal-
lenge bit C,. 
In some embodiments, the PUF includes only linear 45 
addition and subtraction of delay elements. Therefore, the 
behavior of the PUF can be modeled by the following 
expressions [13]: 
safe to assume that the 1\s are independent and identically 
distributed Gaussian variables, i.e., 
0/sN(O,o), 
j=l, 2, ... , N+l, 
then the following statistical properties hold for a linear 
arbiter PUF: 
(a) The output response bits are equally likely over the 
entire space of challenges, i.e., 
Prob{r~-1 }~Prob{r~l }~0.5. 
Half of the challenges map to r=-1 and the other half maps 
to r=l. 
(b) The responses to similar challenges are similar. In 
other words, the probability that the responses ra and r1 to 
respective input challenge vectors Ca and C1 are different is 
a monotonically increasing function of the Hamming dis-
tance between the input challenges, i.e., 
Prob{r0,orl}~j(HD(C0,C1). 
For example, in the trivial cases, HD(Ca,C1)=0, i.e., Ca=C1, 
then Prob{r0>'rl }=O. The Hamming distance between chal-
lenges Cx and CY may be defined as 
N 
HD(Cx, Cy)=~ ICx[i]-Cy[i]I/N, 
i=l 
N 
!:.t= ~ (-1/ioj+ON+!, 
j=l 
(lA) 
50 where Cx[i], Cy[i]E{-1,1}. As the Hamming distance 
between the input challenge vectors becomes larger, the 
probability of having different PUF response bits increases. 
r = { 0 if !:.t < 0 , 
1 1f !:.t > 0 
(lB) 
where li.t denotes the arrival time difference between the two 
paths at the arbiter, where r denotes the response bit, where 
The second property leaks information about the PUF 
response sequence, which would help in breaking the PUF 
55 security by pattern matching. Ideally, PUFs are expected to 
have a property called strict avalanche criterion. Any flip in 
the challenge bits of a PUF with avalanche criterion should 
cause the response bits to flip with probability of 50%. Any 
p1 is related to the input challenge that controls the switch 60 
selectors by the following relation, 
deviation from this criterion reduces the security of the 
system built based on these PUFs. To achieve this criterion, 
it has been proposed in [14] and [15] to mix the responses 
from the arbiter PUFs with XOR logic. In the next subsec-
tion, we review this subclass of PUFs. 
Pi= EB Cx=CiEBCi+lEB ... EBcN. (2) 
x=i,i+l, .. ,N 65 
C. XOR-Mixed Arbiter PUFs 
FIG. 3 shows a two-stage XOR-mixed arbiter PUF 
denoted with label 300. The first stage includes switches Sa a 
through Sa,n and flip-flip 310. The second stage includ~s 
US 9,628,272 B2 
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switches S1 ,0 through S1 ,n and flip-flip 315. The output of the 
first stage and the output of the second stage are coupled to 
the inputs of an XOR gate 320. The step input 305 is 
supplied to the inputs of both stages. Note that the challenge 
sequence in the second stage is applied in reverse order 5 
relative to the order of application in the first stage. The 
order is reversed to help achieve the avalanche criterion. As 
more independent PUF response bits are mixed, the prob-
ability that the output is flipped when one input bit changes, 
comes closer to the ideal probability of 0.5. 10 
In addition to achieving the avalanche criterion, the 
XOR-mixed arbiter PUF requires a significantly larger set of 
challenge-response pairs to successfully train the PUF 
model for a given target level of accuracy. However, there is 15 
a cap on the number of stages that can be actually used in 
practice. This is due to the fact that XOR-mixing causes 
error accumulation of PUF responses. For instance, for a 
single PUF response bit error of 5%, the probability of error 
for a 4-XOR-mixed PUF is 19% [14]. The protocols dis- 20 
closed in this patent disclosure allow a higher level of 
security without increasing the number of XOR stages. 
III. Related Work 
14 
All of the aforementioned methods incur a rather high 
overhead of error correction and/or hashing, which prohibits 
their usage in lightweight systems. An alternative efficient 
error correction method by pattern matching of responses 
was very recently proposed [9]. However, their proposed 
protocol and application area was limited to secret key 
generation. 
This patent disclosure introduces (among other things) 
lightweight PUF authentication and commitment protocols 
based on string pattern matching and covert indices. Mod-
eling attacks against these protocols is thwarted by leaking 
very limited information from a PUF response string. The 
random indices used in the protocols are inherently inde-
pendent of the response string content. 
IV. Authentication and Key Exchange Protocols 
In this section, an authentication and key exchange pro-
tocol are introduced and explained in detail. The protocols 
may be based on a Strong PUF with acceptable statistical 
properties, like the one shown in FIG. 3. The authentication 
protocol enables a Prover with physical access to the PUF to 
authenticate itself to a Verifier, and the key exchange pro-
tocol enables the Prover and the Verifier to securely 
25 exchange secret keys between each other. 
PUFs have been subject to modeling attacks. The basis for 
contemporary PUF modeling attacks is collecting a set of 
CRPs, and then building a numerical or an algorithmic 
model from the collected data. For the attack to be success-
ful, the models should be able to correctly predict the PUF 30 
response to new challenges with a high probability. Previous 
work on PUF modeling (reverse engineering) used various 
machine learning techniques to attack both implementation 
and simulations of a number of different PUF families, 
including linear arbiter PUFs and feed-forward arbiter PUFs 35 
[8], [13], [14], [16], [17]. More comprehensive analysis and 
description of PUF security requirements to protect against 
modeling attacks were presented in [18]-[20]. In recent 
years, there has been an ongoing effort to model and protect 
PUFs against side channel attacks such as power analysis 40 
[21] and fault injection [22]. 
Extracting secret keys from PUF responses has been 
explored in previous work, including [4], [16] and [23]-
[25]. Since cryptographic keys need to be stable, error 
correction is used for stabilizing inherently noisy PUF 45 
response bits. The classic method for stabilizing noisy PUF 
bits ( and noisy biometrics) is error correction, which is done 
by using helper bits or syndrome [26], which has a high 
overhead. 
It is assumed that an honest Verifier has access to a 
compact secret model of the functional relationship between 
challenge and response of the Strong PUF. Such a model can 
be built by training a compact parametric model of the 
Strong PUF on a set of direct challenge-response pairs. As 
long as the responses of the challenge-response pairs are 
obtained from the linear PUF, right before the XOR-mixing 
stage, building and training such a compact model is pos-
sible with a relatively small set of CRPs as demonstrated in 
[8], [13], [14], [16], [17]. The physical access to the mea-
surement points may then be permanently disabled before 
deployment, e.g., by burning irreversible fuses, so other 
entities cannot build the same model. Once these access 
points are blocked, any physical attack that involves de-
packaging the chip will likely alter the shared secret. 
Unlike the original PUF challenge-response pair identi-
fication and authentication methodologies, our protocols are 
devised such that both Prover and Verifier jointly participate 
in producing the challenges. The joint challenge generation 
provides effective protection against a number of attacks. 
Unlike original PUF methods, an adversary cannot build a 
database of CRPs and use an entry in the database for 
authentication or key exchange. The next two subsections 
describe various embodiments of our protocols in detail. The 
In the context of challenge-response based authentication 
for Strong PUFs, sending the syndrome bits for correcting 
the errors before hashing was investigated [ 4]; the necessity 
for error correction was due to hashing the responses before 
sending them to avoid reverse engineering. Naturally, the 
inputs to the hash have to be stable to have a predictable 
response. The proposed error-correction methods in this 
context are classic error correction and fuzzy extraction 
techniques. Aside from sensitivity to PUF noise (because it 
satisfies the strict avalanche criterion), hashing and error 
correction has the drawback of high overhead in terms of 
area, delay, and power. 
50 last subsection concludes the section with some notes about 
the PUF secret-sharing process. 
A. Authentication Protocol 
FIG. 4 illustrates an embodiment 400 of our authentica-
tion protocol. Steps 1-4 of the protocol ensure joint genera-
55 tion of the challenges by the Prover and the Verifier. In Steps 
1-2 the Prover and the Verifier may each use its own true 
random number generator (TRNG) unit to generate a nonce. 
(Note that arbiter PUFs can also be used to implement a 
TRNG [28].) The Prover-generated nonce and the Verifier-
60 generated nonce are denoted respectively by NonceP and 
Noncev. The nonces are exchanged between the parties, so 
both entities have access to NonceP and Noncev. Step 3 
generates a random seed by concatenating the individual 
nonces of the Prover and the Verifier. In other words, 
A newer information-theoretically secure Index-Based 
Syndrome (IBS) error correction coding for PUFs was 
introduced and realized in [25]. In [27], authors proposed the 
notion of public physically unclonable functions (PPUF) 65 
and proposed a public key-exchange protocol based on 
them. 
Seed~{NoncevllNoncep}. 
where "II" denotes the concatenation operator. 
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The generated Seed is used by a pseudo-random number 
generator (PRNG) in Step 4. Both the Prover and the Verifier 
have a copy of this PRNG module. The PRNG output using 
the seed, i.e., 
c~G(Seed), 
is then applied to the PUF as a challenge set (C). Note that 
in this way, neither the Prover nor the Verifier has full 
control over the PUF challenge stream. 
In Step 5, the Prover applies the challenges to its physical 
PUF to obtain a response stream (R), i.e., 
R~PUF(C). 
16 
above-described embodiments, besides a PUF ( e.g., a Strong 
PUF), the Prover only needs to implement one TRNG and 
one PRNG. In addition to exchanging their respective ses-
sion nonces, the Prover only needs to send a relatively short 
5 padded substring to the Verifier. Additionally, the protocol 
has the added benefit that the ranges of the respective secret 
indices ind1 and ind2 are flexible and can be tuned depending 
on the security requirements. The matching threshold can 
also be calculated to tolerate a predefined PUF error thresh-
10 old. 
FIG. 6A illustrates an embodiment of the extraction and 
An honest Verifier with access to a secret compact model of 
the PUF ("the PUF model") also estimates the PUF output 15 
stream, i.e., 
padding processes, where the substring Wis injected into the 
padded substring PW as one contiguous whole, i.e., without 
allowing the substring W to circularly wrap within the 
padded substring PW. Thus, the value of ind2 is constrained 
to be in the range {O, 1, ... , Lpw-Lsub}. In the illustrated 
R'~PUF _model(C). 
Let us assume that the full response bitstring R is oflength 
L. In Step 6, the Prover randomly chooses an index (ind1 ) 
that points to a location in the full response bitstring. (This 
index may be of bit-size logiL).) This index points to the 
beginning of a substring (W) with a predefined length 
denoted Lsub· We use the full response string in a circular 
manner, so that if 
(ind1 +L,ub)>L, 
the remainder of the substring values are taken from the 
beginning of the full response bitstream: 
W(j)~R((j+ind1)mod L)), 
j=O, ], ... ' Lsub-1. 
This operation is illustrated in FIG. SA. 
In step 7, the Prover pads the substring W with random 
bits to create a bitstream PW of length Lpw· (The bitstream 
PW is also referred to herein as "the padded substring".) In 
this padding process, starting from a randomly chosen index 
(ind2 ), the PUF substring W from step 6 is inserted. The 
substring W may be inserted into the padded substring PW 
according to a circular insertion scheme or a linear insertion 
scheme. In the circular insertion scheme, if the value (ind2 + 
Lsub) is greater than Lpw, the remainder of the substring 
values are taken from the beginning of the full response 
bitstream. 
PW(k)~R((k+ind1)mod L)) 
k=ind2 , ind2 +1, ind2 +2, ind2 +Lsu6 -l. 
This operation is illustrated in FIG. SB. In the linear inser-
tion scheme, the substring W is injected into the padded 
substring PW as one contiguous whole, i.e., without allow-
ing the substring W to circularly wrap within the padded 
substring PW. Thus, the value of ind2 is constrained to be in 
the range {O, 1, ... , LnvLsub}. 
example, a substring W of length Lsub = 12 is extracted from 
a response string R of length L=26. The substring W is 
extracted with a start position given by ind1=9. The sub-
20 string W is injected into a padded substring PW of length 
Lpw=24 with start position given by ind2 =3. 
FIG. 68 continues with the example of FIG. 6A, and 
illustrates the process whereby the Verifier matches the 
received padded substring PW against his model-generated 
25 PUF response R', assuming that the substring W occurs as 
one contiguous whole within the padded substring PW, i.e., 
without circularly wrapping. Note that the model-generated 
PUF response R' is not exactly equal to the PUF response R. 
Two error bits are shown. The authentication is declared to 
30 be successful if the Hamming distance between the substring 
W and the corresponding portion of the model-generated 
PUF response R' is lower than a predefined threshold value. 
B. Session Key-Exchange Protocol 
It is possible to piggyback a session key-exchange pro-
35 tocol on the authentication protocol of FIG. 4. The Prover 
can encode secret keys in the secret indices of authentication 
protocol, e.g., in indices ind1 and ind2 . The Verifier can 
recover these secret indices at the end of a successful 
authentication. If the length of secret indices is not enough 
40 to encode the whole secret key, the authentication protocol 
may be repeated multiple times until the required number of 
secret bits is transmitted to the Verifier. We now describe this 
concept with an example. 
If the length of PUF response string is 1024 bits, ind1 is 
45 chosen from the range of O to 1023. Therefore, we can 
encode !Obits by using ind1 . If the length Lpwofthe padded 
substring PW is 1024 bits, ind2 is chosen from the range 0 
to 1023. Therefore, 10 bits of a secret key can be encoded 
by ind2 . In this parameter configuration, 20 bits overall can 
50 be exchanged between the parties with one run of the 
authentication protocol. If the length of the secret key is 120 
bits, the protocol of FIG. 4 should be executed 6=120/20 
times to transfer the entire secret key. The present key 
exchange protocol can securely exchange session keys with 
In step 8, when an honest Verifier receives the padded 
substring PW, he performs a circular maximum-sequence 
alignment against his simulated PUF output sequence (R') to 
determine which bits belong to the PUF response string and 
which bits were generated randomly. The authentication is 
declared to be successful only if the Hamming distance 
between the received substring R and the simulated sub-
string R' is lower than a predefined threshold value. After 60 
this operation, the Verifier determines the value of the secret 
indices ind1 and ind2 . However, these values do not affect 
the authentication process. 
55 minimum overhead, while protecting against machine learn-
ing attacks and PUF response errors. 
The key-exchange protocol can be followed up with a step 
to check whether the Verifier has received the correct 
indices. To do so, the Prover only needs to send the hashed 
values of the indices to the Verifier for verification. 
C. Secret Sharing 
So far we have assumed that the Verifier possesses a 
model of the PUF and uses the model to authenticate the 
Prover. The PUF may have an e-fuse to protect the secret and 
prevent modeling attacks. The chip sets may be handled by 
a trusted party before distributing the chip sets to end users. 
In the authentication process, the Prover does not reveal 
the whole response stream and the protocol leaks a minimal 65 
amount of information. The protocol is also lightweight and 
suitable for ultra-low power and embedded devices. In the The trusted party performs modeling on the PUF and 
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disables the fuse before distribution. Anyone with access to 
the IC afterwards will not be able to model the PUF since the 
fuse is disabled. The trusted party can share the PUF models 
with other authorized trusted parties that want to authenti-
cate the ICs. 
Thee-fuse mechanism is operates as follows. Before the 
e-fuse is disabled, the inputs to the XOR logic of the arbiter 
PUF can be accessed from chip IO pins. (XOR is an 
acronym for "Exclusive OR". IO is an acronym for input-
output.) This way, the Verifier can obtain as many CRPs as 
needed to build an accurate model of the PUF. After the 
model is successfully trained, the trusted party and/or the 
Verifier disables thee-fuse so that no one else can obtain the 
"raw" PUF output before the XOR-mixing stage. 
V. Analysis of Attacks 
In this section, we quantify the resistance of the presently-
disclosed protocols against different attacks by a malicious 
party (Prover or Verifier). Due to the similarity of the 
authentication and key exchange protocols, similar attacks 
analysis apply to both of them. 
18 
protocol, the direct responses are not revealed and the 
attacker needs to correctly guess the secret indices to be able 
to discover Lsub challenge-response pairs. ind1 is a number 
between O and L-1. (L is the length of the original response 
5 string R from which the substring W is obtained.) ind2 is a 
number between O and Lpw-1. (Lpw is the length of the 
padded substring PW.) 
Assuming the attacker tries to randomly guess the indices, 
he will be faced with LxLpw choices. For each iter choice, 
10 the attacker can build a PUF model (M,,er) by training it on 
the set of Lsub challenge-response pairs using machine 
learning methods. 
Now, the attacker could launch LxLpwrounds of authen-
15 tication with the Verifier and each time use one of his trained 
models instead of the actual PUF. Ifhe correctly guesses the 
indices and his model is accurate enough, one of his models 
will pass authentication. To build an accurate model as 
mentioned above, the attacker needs to obtain Nm,n correct 
20 challenge-response pairs. IfLsub>Nm,m then the attacker can 
break the system with O(LxLpw) number of attempts. How-
ever if Lsub<Nm,m then the attacker needs to launch Nm,) 
Lsub rounds of authentication to obtain at least Nm,n chal-
lenge-response pairs. Under this scenario, the number of 
In the first subsection, we quantitatively analyze their 
resiliency to machine learning attacks. Second, we proba-
bilistically investigate the odds of breaking the protocols by 
random guessing. Third, we address the attack where a 
dishonest Prover (Verifier) attempts to control the PUF 
challenge pattern. Lastly, the effects of non-idealities of 
PUFs and PRNGs and their impact on protocol security are 
discussed. Throughout our analysis in this section, we 30 
investigate the impact of various parameters on security and 
reliability of protocol operation. Table I lists these param-
25 hypothetical PUF models will grow exponentially. Since for 
each round of authentication there are LxLpwmodels based 
on the choice of index values ind1 and ind2 , for Nm,)Lsub 
rounds, the number of models will be of the following order: 
Nmin 
(LXLp)L,ub. 
(5) 
eters. 
Parameter 
k 
N 
th 
Perr 
TABLE I 
LIST OF PARAMETERS 
Description 
Length of nonce. 
Length of PUF response string. 
Length of PUF response substring. 
Length of padded substring. 
Index to the beginning of the substring, where 
0 ,; ind 1 < L. 
Index at which the PUF substring is inserted, where 
0 ,; ind2 < Lpw· 
Minimum nwnber CRPs needed to train 
the PUF model with a misclassification 
rate of less than E. 
Number ofXORed PUF outputs 
Number of PUF switch stages 
Matching distance threshold 
PUF modeling misclassification rate 
Probability of error in PUF responses 
A. PUF Modeling Attack 
In order to model a linear PUF with a given level of 
accuracy, it is sufficient to obtain a minimum number CNm,n) 
of direct challenge-response pairs (CRPs) from the PUF. 
Nm,n depends on the PUF type and also the learning strategy. 
Based on theoretical considerations ( e.g., dimension of the 
feature space, Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension), it is sug-
gested in [8] that the minimal number of CRPs, N min' that is 
necessary to model a N-stage delay based linear PUF with 
a misclassification rate of E is given by: 
35 From the above equation, it seems intmt1ve to choose 
small values for Lsub, to make the exponent bigger. How-
ever, small Lsub increases the success rate of random guess-
ing attacks. The implications of small Lsub will be discussed 
in more detail in the next section. 
40 The model that the attacker is building has to be only 
more accurate than the specified threshold during the match-
ing. For example, if we allow a 10% tolerance during the 
substring matching process, then it means that a PUF model 
that emulates the actual PUF responses with more than 90% 
45 accuracy will be able to pass authentication. Based on Eq. 4, 
if we allow higher misclassification rate E, then a smaller 
number of CRPs is needed to build an accurate enough 
model which passes the authentication. 
To improve the security while maintaining reliable per-
50 formance, Nm,n must be increased for a fixed E and N. This 
requires a structural change to delay based PUF. In some 
embodiments, we use the XOR PUF circuit shown in FIG. 
3 for two reasons. First, to satisfy the avalanche criterion for 
the PUF. Second, to increase N min for a fixed E. Based on the 
55 results reported in the experimental evaluation section, Nm,n 
is an order of magnitude larger for XOR PUF than for a 
simple delay based PUF. 
B. Random Guessing Attack 
A legitimate Prover should be able to generate a padded 
60 substring of PUF responses that successfully match a sub-
string of the Verifier's emulated response sequence. The 
legitimate Prover must be authenticated by an honest Veri-
fier with a very high probability, even if the response 
(4) 65 
substring contains some errors. Therefore, the protocol 
allows some tolerance during matching by setting a thresh-
old on the Haniming distance of the source and target For example, a PUF model with 90% accuracy, has a 
misclassification rate of 8=10%. In the presently-disclosed substrings. 
US 9,628,272 B2 
19 20 
Simultaneously, the probability of authenticating a dis-
honest Prover should be extremely low. These conditions 
can be fulfilled by carefully selecting the Hamming distance 
threshold (th), the substring length (Lsub), the total length of 
the padded substring (Lpw), and the original response string 5 
length (L) by our protocol. A dishonest Prover without 
access to the original PUF or its model, may resort to 
sending a substring of random bits. In this case, the prob-
ability of authentication by a randomly guessing attacker, 
denoted P Anv, would be: 10 
enated nonces of length Ln bits), the chance that the same 
nonce appears twice is 2-Ln). For example, for 
the probability of being able to fully control the seed will be 
negligibly small. Therefore, one could effectively guard 
against any kind of random seed compromise by increasing 
the nonce lengths. The only overhead of this approach is a 
twofold increase in the runtime of the TRNG. 
D. Substring Replay Attack 
(6) 
PADV = (L·Lpw)X 
where Lsub and th are the length of the substring and the 
Hamming distance threshold, respectively. Eq. 6 is derived 
with this assumption that the adversary has L·Lpw chances 
to match the simulated PUF response, and in each match, the 
probability of success is calculated using a binomial cumu-
lative distribution function. 
A dishonest Prover may mount an attack by recording the 
padded substrings associated with each used Seed. In this 
attack, a malicious Prover records the response substrings 
sent by an honest Prover to an honest Verifier for a specific 
15 Seed. The recording may be performed by eavesdropping on 
the communication channel between the legitimate Prover 
and Verifier. A malicious party may even pre-record a set of 
response substrings to various random Seeds by posing as a 
legitimate Verifier and exchanging nonces with the authentic 
20 Prover. 
For an honest Prover, the probability of being correctly 25 
authenticated, denoted by PHonest is: 
After recording a sufficiently large number of Seeds and 
their corresponding response substrings, the malicious party 
could attempt to impersonate an honest Prover. This may be 
done by repeatedly contacting the legitimate Verifier for 
authentication and then matching the generated Seeds to its 
pre-recorded database. This attack could only happen if the 
PHonest = 
~ ( L,ub ) ; L,ub-; U i (l - Perr) Perr , 
(7) 
i=Lsub-th 
where Perr is i the probability of an error in a response bit. 
30 
Seeds collide. Selecting a sufficiently long Seed that cannot 
be controlled by one party (Subsection V-B) would hinder 
this collision attack. 
If Lsub is chosen to be a sufficiently large number, P ADV 35 
will be close to zero, and P Honest will be close to one. 
Passive eavesdropping is performed during the pre-re-
cording phase. The chances that the whole Seed collides will 
be 2-Ln. The worst-case scenario is when an adversary 
impersonates a Verifier and controls half of the seed which 
reduces the collision probability to 2-Ln 
E. Exploiting Non-Idealities of PRNG and PUF 
Thus far, we assumed that the outputs of PRNG and PUF 
are ideal and statistically unbiased. If this is not true, an 
attacker may resort to exploiting the statistical bias in a 
non-ideal PRNG or PUF to attack the system. Therefore, in 
C. Compromising the Random Seed 
In the protocol, the Prover and the Verifier jointly generate 
the random PRNG seed by concatenating the outputs of their 
individual nonces (generated by TRNGs); i.e., 
seed~{NoncevllNoncep}. 
The stream of PRNG outputs after applying the seed is then 
used as the PUF challenge set. This way, neither the Prover 
nor the Verifier has full control over generating the PUF 
challenge stream. 
If one of the parties can fully control the seed and 
challenge sequence, then the following attack scenario can 
happen. An adversary that poses as a Verifier can manipulate 
an honest Prover into revealing the secret information. If the 
same seed is used over and over during authentication 
rounds, then the generated response sequence (super-string) 
will always be the same. The response substrings now come 
from the same original response string. By collecting a large 
enough number of substrings and putting the pieces together, 
the original super-string can be reconstructed. Reconstruc-
tion will reveal L CRPs. By repeating these steps, more 
CRPs can be revealed and the PUF can be ultimately 
modeled. 
An imposter Prover (Verifier) may intentionally keep 
his/her portion of the seed constant to reduce the entropy of 
seed. This way, the attacker can exert more control over the 
random challenges applied to the PUF. We argue that if the 
seed length is long enough this strategy will not be success-
ful. 
This attack leaves only half of the bits in the generated 
Seed changing. For a seed of length 2Ln bits (two concat-
40 this section we emphasize the importance of the PUF 
avalanche criterion for securing against this class of attacks. 
If the PUF has poor statistical properties, then the attacker 
can predict patterns in the generated responses. The attacker 
can use these predicted patterns to guess a matching location 
45 for the substring. In other words, statistical bias in the 
responses will leak information about the values of secret 
indices. 
Recall that an ideal Strong PUF should have the strict 
avalanche property [20]. This property states that if one bit 
50 of the PUF's input challenges is flipped, the PUF output 
response should flip with a 1/2 probability. If this property 
holds, the PUF output for two different challenges will be 
uncorrelated. This probability can be almost achieved when 
at least more than two independent PUF output bits are 
55 mixed by an XOR. As more independent PUF response bits 
are mixed, the probability of a bit flip in the output due a one 
bit change in the input moves closer to the ideal case; 
however, this linearly increases the probability of error in the 
mixed output. For instance, for a single Strong PUF 
60 response bit error of 5%, the probability of error for 4-XOR 
mixing is reported to be 19% in [20]. 
In our implementation, linear feedback shift registers 
(LFSRs) are used as a lightweight PRNG. An ideal LFSR 
must have the maximum length sequence property [29]. This 
65 property ensures that the autocorrelation function of the 
LFSR output stream is "impulsive", i.e., it is one at lag zero 
and is -1/N for all other lags, where N is the LFSR 
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sequences length. N should be a sufficiently large number, 
which renders the lagged autocorrelations very close to zero 
[29]. Therefore, if an LFSR generates a sequence of chal-
lenges to the PUF, the challenges are uncorrelated. In other 
words, for an ideal LFSR, it is highly unlikely that an 5 
attacker can find two challenges with a very small Hamming 
distance. 
Even if the attacker finds two challenges with a small 
Hamming distance in the sequence, the output of our pro-
posed PUF would be sufficiently uncorrelated to the Ham- 10 
ming distance of the input challenges. Therefore, a combi-
nation of PRNG and PUF with strict avalanche criteria 
would make this attack highly unlikely. It is worth noting 
that it is not required by any means for the PRNG to be a 15 
cryptographically secure generator. The seed in the protocol 
is public and the only purpose of the PRNG is to generate 
sequences of independent random challenge vectors from 
the Prover and Verifier nonces. 
F. Man-in-the-Middle Attack on Key Exchange 20 
Asymmetric cryptographic algorithms, such as RSA and 
Diffie-Hellman, are traditionally used to exchange secret 
keys. These asymmetric algorithms are susceptible to man-
in-the-middle attacks [30]. Therefore, a certificate authority 
is necessary for a secure implementation of these algorithms. 25 
However, our key exchange algorithm is not susceptible to 
man-in-the-middle attack and no certificate authority is 
required for implementation. 
An attacker, who intercepts the padded PUF substring, 
does not know the PUF response string. Therefore, he does 30 
not know the value of secret indices, and he cannot change 
the padded PUF substring to forge a specific key. An 
attacker, however, can possibly rotate the padded substring 
to add or subtract from the secret value of ind2 . Even in this 
case, the attacker does not know the new value of ind2 and 35 
carmot act upon it to open a forged encrypted charmel. 
Rotating the padded substring will only result in a denial of 
service attack which is already possible by jamming. 
VI. Trade-offs in Protocol Parameters 40 
In this section, the trade-offs in choosing the parameters 
of the protocols are explored by analyzing the PUF mea-
surement data collected in the lab. False acceptance and 
false rejection probabilities depend on PUF error rates. 45 
There have been no comprehensive reports till this date on 
PUF response error rates (caused by variations in tempera-
ture and power supply conditions) nor any solid data on 
modeling error rates measured on real PUF challenge-
response pairs. The data reported in the related literature 50 
mainly come from synthetic ( emulated) PUF results rather 
than actual reliable PUF measurements and tests. 
A. Experimental Setup 
We used the data we measured and collected across 10 
Xilinx Virtex 5 (LXllO) FPGAs at 9 accurately-controlled 55 
operating conditions (combinations of different tempera-
tures and power supply points). Each FPGA holds 16 PUFs 
and each PUF is tested using 64,000 random challenges. 
Ideal PUF responses are obtained by challenging the PUF 
128 times at the nominal condition (temperature=35° C. and 60 
V nn=l V), and then taking a consensus of these responses. 
The error rate is now defined as the percentage deviation 
from the consensus response. For example, if 10 bits from 
the 128 bits are ones and the rest are zeros, the deviation 
from the majority response, or the response error rate, is 65 
(10/128)xl00~7.8%. 
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Table II shows the average deviation (taken over 64,000 
challenge-response pairs) of these experiments from the 
ideal response at the nominal condition. As it can be seen 
from this table, the error rate is substantially higher in 
non-nominal conditions. The worst case scenario happens 
when the temperature is 5° C. and the voltage is 0.95V. The 
table shows that 30° C. degree change in temperature will 
have a bigger effect on the error rate than a 5% voltage 
change. 
TABLE II 
AVERAGE BIT ERROR RATE OF PUF IN DIFFERENT VOLTAGE 
AND TEMPERATURE CONDITIONS IN COMPARISON WITH 
THE IDEAL PUF OUTPUT AT NOMINAL CONDITION 
0.95 V 
1.00 V 
1.05 V 
5° C. 
8.4% 
6.8% 
7.2% 
Tern erature 
35° C. 
6.2% 
3.1% 
6.7% 
65° C. 
7.1% 
6.4% 
7.9% 
As mentioned earlier, the Verifier repeatedly tests the PUF 
in the factory to obtain a consensus of the PUF responses for 
an array of random challenges. The Verifier then uses the 
reliable response bits to build a PUF Model for himself. 
When the PUF is deployed in the field, the Prover challenges 
its own PUF and send the responses to the Verifier. The 
average error rate of the prover response in different working 
conditions against the Verifier's model is listed in Table III. 
TABLE III 
AVERAGE BIT ERROR RATE OF THE VERIFIERS PUF 
MODEL AGAINST THE PUF OUTPUTS IN DIFFERENT 
VOLTAGE AND TEMPERATURE CONDITIONS. 
Tern erature 
VDD 5° C. 35° C. 65° C. 
0.95 V 13.2% (*) 10.5% 10.7% 
1.00 V 8.9% 6.4% 8.9% 
1.05 V 9.3% 10.2% 11.8% 
(*) THE WORST-CASE SCENARIO. 
The listed errors are the compound of two types of error. 
The first type is the error in PUF output due to noise of 
environment as well as operating condition fluctuations. The 
second type is the inevitable modeling error of the Verifier's 
PUF model. These error rates are tangibly higher than the 
error rates of Table II. The worst error rate is recorded at 5° 
C. temperature and voltage of0.95V. This error rate is taken 
as the worst-case error rate between an honest Verifier and 
an honest Prover. We will use this error rate to estimate the 
false acceptance and false rejection probability of the 
authentication protocol. 
B. Modeling Attack Complexity and Protocol Parameters 
As explained earlier, the attack complexity depends expo-
nentially on the minimum required number of challenge-
response pairs (CRPs), i.e., Nm,m to reach a modeling error 
rate of less than di, the matching threshold in the protocol. 
The matching threshold in the protocol is incorporated to 
create a tolerance for errors in the responses caused by 
modeling error as well as errors due to environment varia-
tions and noise. 
By relaxing the tolerance for errors in the protocol (i.e., 
increasing di), we basically increase the probability of 
attack. In contrast, by lowering the tolerance for errors, the 
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rate at which the authentication of a genuine PUF fails due 
to noisy responses increases. As a rule of thumb, the 
tolerance has to be set greater than the maximum response 
error rate to achieve sensible false rejection and false accep-
tance probabilities. 
Once the tolerance level (th) is fixed to achieve the desired 
false rejection and false acceptance probabilities, Nm,n must 
be increased to hinder modeling attacks. However, Nm,n and 
th are inter-related for a given PUF structure. In other words, 
for a given fixed PUF structure, increasing th mandates that 
a less accurate model can pass the authentication, and that 
model can be trained with a smaller number of CRPs 
(smaller Nm,n). The only way to achieve a higher Nm,n for a 
fixed th is to change the PUF structure. 
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According to the above tables, the maximum error rates 
measured from the XOR PUF responses are 24.7%, 34.6% 
and 43.2% for 2-input, 3-input and 4-input XOR-ed PUF, 
respectively. To guarantee reliable authentication at all oper-
5 ating conditions, the error tolerance (th) of the protocol must 
be set above the maximum error rates. Now after deriving 
the PUF error rate, we would like to know how many 
challenge-response pairs are required to train the PUF model 
and reach a modeling error rate that falls below the tolerance 
10 level. In other words, we need to know how many challenge-
response pairs the adversary needs to collect in order to pass 
the authentication and break the system. 
To answer this question, we trained and tested the PUF 
model on the data collected in the lab from real PUF 
15 implementations. We measured the modeling accuracy as a 
function of train/test set size for each PUF. The results in 
Earlier in the patent disclosure, we discussed using XOR 
PUFs instead of a single arbiter-based PUF in order to 
increase Nm,n for a fixed th. As reported previously in the 
related literature, XORing the PUF outputs makes the 
machine learning more difficult and requires a larger CRP set 
for model building. The major problem with XORing the 
PUF outputs is error accumulation. For example, if the 20 
outputs of two arbiter-based PUFs are mixed withXORs, the 
XOR PUF response error rate will be about the sum of each 
individual arbiter-based PUF's errors. This means the error 
FIG. 7 show the modeling error using evolutionary strategy 
(ES) machine learning methods. 
Based on the results in FIG. 7, the largest value ofNm,m 
after taking into account the error threshold (th) derived 
earlier, is achieved for an XORed-PUF with 3 stages. In 
other words, 64,000 CRPs must be collected to achieve a 
modeling error rate ofless than 34.6%. Therefore, Nm,n =64, 
000 for 3-stage XOR-ed PUF. tolerance also has to be doubled to have reliable operation. 
This observation of trade-off between Nm,n and th, led us to 25 
quantify this effect. 
Table VII shows the false rejection and false acceptance 
error rate of our protocol with the length of PUF response 
sequence and the length of additional pads fixed at 1028 and 
512, respectively. False rejection rate is the rate at which the 
service to the truthful Prover is disrupted. It may be calcu-
In order to quantify the trade-off between Nm,n and th, we 
first calculate the effective compound error rate of XOR-
mixed PUF outputs for different operating conditions and 
different numbers of PUF stages. Tables IV, V and VI show 
the effective response error rate respectively for 2-input, 
3-input and 4-input XOR PUF. 
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TABLE VII 
FALSE REJECTION AND ACCEPTANCE ERROR PROBABILITIES 
FOR DIFFERENT PROTOCOL PARAMETERS 
L,ub 1250 
Error threshold 487 477 467 
Fake rejection 0.2% 1% 5% 
False acceptance 9e-10 0 0 
The requirements on the false rejection rate are not 
usually as stringent as the requirements on the false accep-
tance rate. However, one should assume that a customer 
45 would deem a product impractical if the false rejection rate 
is higher than a threshold. In our protocol design, we tune 
the system parameter to achieve a false negative rate of 1 %, 
while minimizing the false acceptance rate. Also, we take 
the worst-case error rate as the basis of our calculation of 
50 false acceptance and false rejection rates. The error rates that 
we report are the upper bound of what can be observed in the 
field by a customer/Prover. 
Table VII shows that the desired false rejection rate of 1 % 
with an acceptable false acceptance rate is achieved when 
55 Lsub=l250 and the error threshold is 
60 
477/1250~38%. 
In this scenario, an adversary needs to perform 
0( (1300·512)<64000/ 1250))=0(2988) 
machine learning attacks in order to break this system, 
which makes the system secure against all computationally-
bounded adversaries. 
At the end, it should be noted that the worst case bit error 
65 rate of our PUF implementation (13.2% in Table III) is much 
higher than a recently reported bit error rate of arbiter PUFs 
[31] (""3-5%). The discrepancy might be explained by the 
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fact that their implementation is based on a 65 nm ASIC 
technology and ours is based on a Virtex 5 FPGA. Therefore, 
the reported security performance of our protocol has the 
potential to be further enhanced by a more custom imple-
mentation with a lower bit error rate. 
VII. Hardware Implementation 
26 
block is used to gather and update statistics for online post 
processing. The online post processing may be performed by 
post-processing unit 908. 
The nonce size is set to 128 for both the Prover and 
5 Verifier. Each 128-bit nonce is fed into a 128-bit LFSR. The 
content of the two LFSRs are XORed to form the challenges 
to the tunable PUF 904. 
In this section, we present an FPGA implementation of 
our protocol for the Prover side on Xilinx Virtex 5 10 
XC5VLX110T FPGAs. FIG. 8 summarizes the resources on 
The propagation delay through the PUF and the TRNG 
core is equal to 61.06 ns. PUF outputs can be generated at 
a maximum rate of 16 Mbit/sec. Post-processing on the 
TRNG output bits can lower the throughput from 16 Mbit/ 
the Prover side and the Verifier side of the protocols, 
according to one embodiment. Since there is a stricter power 
consumption requirement on the lightweight Prover, we 
focus our evaluation on Prover implementation overhead. 
The computation on the Verifier side can run solely in 
software, however, the computation on the Verifier may also 
be carried out in hardware with negligible overhead. 
The Verifier 802 may include a physical unclonable 
function (PUF) 804, a true random number generator 
(TRNG) 806, a FIFO buffer 808, a pseudo-random number 
generator (PRNG) 810 and a controller 812. The Verifier 814 
may be implemented in software. For example, the Verifier 
814 may include software modules such as a TRNG module 
816, a matching algorithm unit 818 and a PUF model 820. 
sec to 2 Mbit/sec. Since the TRNG is only used to generate 
the nonce and the indices, we can run TRNG before the start 
15 of the protocol and pre-record these values. Therefore, its 
throughput does not affect the overall system performance. 
TABLE VIII 
IMPLEMENTATION OVERHEAD ON VIRTEX 5 FPGA 
20 
RAM ROM Clock 
No. Type LUT Registers blocks blocks Cycles 
4 PUF 128 0 0 
TRNG 128 12 4KB 64 KB 8 
25 FIFO 0 1250 0 0 NIA 
2 LFSR 2 128 0 0 NIA 
It is desirable to use a low overhead PUF implementation, 
such as the one introduced in [32]. If an ASIC or analog 
implementation of the PUF is required, the ultra-low power 
architecture in [28] is suitable for this protocol. (ASIC is an 30 
acronym for Application Specific Integrated Circuit.) A very 
low-power Verifier implemented by a microcontroller such 
Control 12 9 0 0 NIA 
--- --- ---
Total 652 1400 4KB 64 KB NIA 
The implementation overhead of our authentication pro-
tocol is much less than traditional cryptographic modules. 
For example, robust hashing implementation of SHA-2 as 
implemented in [36] requires at least 1558 LUTs of a as the Texas Instruments MSP430 can easily challenge the PUF and run the subsequent steps of the protocol. 
We use the implementation of the arbiter-based PUF in 35 
[33]. The arbiter-based PUF on FPGAis designed to have 64 
input challenges. In total, 128 look-up tables (LUTs) and one 
flip-flop are used to generate one bit of response. To achieve 
Virtex-II FPGA and it takes 490 clock cycles to evaluate. 
This overhead will occur on the top of the clock cycles 
required for PUF evaluation. 
The overhead of our key exchange protocol should be 
compared against symmetric key-exchange algorithms not a higher throughput, multiple parallel PUFs can be imple-
mented on the same FPGA. 
There are various existing implementations for TRNGs on 
FPGAs [34], [35]. We use the architecture presented in [32] 
to implement a true random number generator. One embodi-
ment of the TRNG architecture is shown in FIG. 9. This 
TRNG (denoted by label 900) may include a tunable PUF 
904, a counter 906, a feedback-encoder unit 910 and a 
post-processing unit 908. The TRNG 900 may operate by 
enforcing a meta-stable state on the flipflop (in the tunable 
PUF 904) through a closed loop feedback system. 
40 asymmetric key-exchange ones, since our protocol assumes 
that a secret PUF as a token has been pre-distributed 
between the Provers. Our key exchange protocol achieves a 
desired level of security with minimal computational over-
head. For example, AES-128 as implemented in [37] 
45 requires at least 738 LUTs of a Virtex-V FPGA, which is 
higher than the combined overhead of our authentication and 
key-exchange as listed in Table VIII. 
VIII. Conclusions and Future Direction 
The TRNG 900 has a tunable PUF as its core that 50 
consumes 128 LUTs that are packed into 16 CLBs on Virtex 
5. (CLB is an acronym for "configurable logic blocks".) The 
PUF of the TRNG may be identical to the arbiter-based PUF 
except that the switches act as tunable programmable delay 
lines. The core is incorporated inside a closed-loop feedback 
system. The core output is attached to the counter 906 ( e.g., 
a 12-bit counter using 12 registers) which monitors the 
arbiter's meta-stability. If the arbiter operates in a purely 
meta-stable fashion, the output bits from the counter become 
equally likely ones and zeros. The counter basically mea-
sures and monitors deviation from this condition, and gen-
erates a difference feedback signal to guide the system to 
return back to its meta-stable state. The counter output 
drives an encoding table (e.g., a table of depth 212) in 
feedback-encoder unit 910. Each row of the encoding table 
contains a 128-bit word, resulting in a 64 KByte ROM. A 
table of size 212x8-bits (=4 KByte) implemented by a RAM 
We have presented secure and low-overhead authentica-
tion and key-exchange protocols based on PUFs. In the 
authentication protocol, the Prover may reveal only a ran-
dom subset of responses for authentication. The Verifier, 
55 which has access to a compact model of the PUF, can search 
and match the received substring with the estimated PUF 
response string. The authentication is declared to be suc-
cessful if a sufficiently close match is found. Akey-exchange 
protocol based on pattern matching has also been described 
60 herein. We have demonstrated that carefully-designed pro-
tocols based on the pattern-matching concept provides a 
much higher level of resiliency against all machine learning 
attacks know to the authors. The experimental results on 
FPGAs showed a significantly lower area and speed over-
65 head compared to any protocol that potentially uses con-
ventional cryptographic modules such as hashing. An even 
smaller footprint and power consumption can potentially be 
US 9,628,272 B2 
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achieved by using analog leakage based PUFs, analog 
TRNGs, and low power micro-controllers. 
In one set of embodiments, a method 1000 may involve 
the operations shown in FIG. 10. (Furthermore, the method 
1000 may include any subset of the features, elements and 
embodiments described above.) The method 1000 is useful 
for operating a verifier device to verify the authenticity of a 
communicating party. The verifier device may include digi-
tal circuitry that is configured to perform the method 1000 
or certain elements of the method 1000. 
At 1010, the verifier device (e.g., a receiver subsystem of 
the verifier device) may receive a data string from the 
communicating party via a communication medium. The 
data string is generated by the communicating party by: (a) 
submitting a challenge to a physical unclonable function to 
obtain a response string, (b) selecting a substring of prede-
termined length from the response string, (c) injecting the 
selected substring into the data string, and (d) injecting 
random bits into bit positions of the data string not assigned 
to the selected substring. In some embodiments, the selected 
substring may be injected into the data string at any start 
position within the data string. If the start position is 
sufficiently close to the end of the data string, the selected 
substring wraps from the end of the data string to the 
beginning of the data string, as described above in the 
discussion of circular paddding. In other embodiments, the 
selected substring is not allowed to circularly wrap, and is 
injected into the data string as one contiguous whole. Thus, 
the start position may be constrained, e.g., to the range {O, 
1, 2, ... , Lpw-Lsub}, where Lpwrepresents the length of the 
data string, and Lsub represents the length of the selected 
substring. 
The position of the selected substring within the data 
string is a secret, not revealed by the communicating party. 
Indeed, the communicating party intentionally obfuscates 
the position of the selected substring by injecting the random 
bits into the data string. Likewise, the position of the 
selected substring within the response string is a secret, not 
revealed by the communicating party. 
The physical unclonable function is a hardware device 
that receives a challenge (vector of input bits) and produces 
a response (a vector of output bits), where the space of 
possible challenges and the space of possible responses are 
vast, where the relationship between challenge and response 
28 
challenge bits and output the response bit. However, in many 
embodiments, the specialized circuitry may include digital 
circuit elements in its internal architecture. In some embodi-
ments, the specialized circuitry may also include analog 
5 circuit elements. 
At 1012, the digital circuitry may generate an estimated 
response string by evaluating a computational model of the 
physical unclonable function based on the challenge, i.e., the 
same challenge used by the communicating party to generate 
10 the original response string. (The computational model for 
the physical unclonable function may be generated using 
any of the techniques described above or using any other 
technique known in the art.) In some embodiments, the 
verifier device and the communicating party may exchange 
15 information to determine the challenge, e.g., as described 
above in connection with FIG. 4. In other embodiments, the 
communicating party may generate the challenge and send 
it to the verifier device. In yet other embodiments, the 
verifier device may generate the challenge and send it to the 
20 communicating party. 
The verifier device may be configured to maintain the 
parameters of the computational model as a secret. The 
parameters may be intentionally concealed from public 
access, or from access by agents external to the verifier 
25 device. 
At 1015, the digital circuitry may perform a search 
process to identify the selected substring within the data 
string using the estimated response string. (See, e.g., FIG. 
6B.) The digital circuitry knows the length of the selected 
30 substring as well as the length of the data string. Indeed, in 
some embodiments, both lengths may be public knowledge. 
The search process 1015 may determine the relative shift 
between the data string and the estimated response string 
that produces the maximum alignment (or similarity) 
35 between the two strings. In some embodiments, the search 
process may be a sequence alignment algorithm such as the 
Needleman-Wunsch algorithm. 
At 1020, the digital circuitry may determine whether the 
communicating party is authentic based on a measure of 
40 similarity between the identified selected substring and a 
corresponding substring of the estimated response string. In 
some embodiments, the measure of similarity is Haniming 
distance. 
In some embodiments, the action of selecting a substring 
45 of predetermined length from the response string may 
include randomly selecting a number ( e.g., the value of the 
index ind1), where a start position of the substring within the 
response string is determined by the randomly-selected 
number. 
is complicated and unique to the hardware device. Thus, it 
may be difficult or impossible to accurately model the 
challenge-response relationship even when given a larger 
number of challenge-response pairs. However, one may 
generate a sufficiently accurate model of the input-output 
relationship if access to internal components or internal 50 
nodes of the hardware device is available, e.g., as variously 
described above. 
In other embodiments, the action of selecting a substring 
of predetermined length from the response string may 
include determining a number by encoding ( or perhaps, 
simply selecting) a non-empty subset of bits from a key, 
where a start position of the substring within the response 
In some embodiments, the processes used to manufacture 
such hardware devices may involve uncontrollable small-
scale randonmess such that the challenge-response relation-
ship of the hardware devices will be very different even 
though they are manufactured according to the same nomi-
nal design, i.e., having the same components with the same 
set of nominal parameters. In other embodiments, the manu-
facturing processes may involve explicitly-introduced ran-
donmess. In yet other embodiments, the manufacturing 
processes may involve a combination of intrinsic random-
ness and explicitly-introduced randonmess. 
The physical unclonable function is realized using spe-
cialized circuitry, not in software (i.e., not by executing a 
computer program on a processor). The specialized circuitry 
includes digital circuit elements at least to receive the 
55 string is determined by the number, e.g., as described above 
in the discussion of the key-exchange protocol. Any desired 
encoding scheme may be employed, including the trivial 
encoding that leaves the subset of bits unaltered. (The term 
"key" is used here in the generic sense of any secret data that 
60 the communicating party desires to send to the verifier 
device without revealing the secret data to other parties.) 
The search process may provide an estimate of the number. 
Thus, the method 1000 may also include recovering the 
non-empty subset of bits of the key from the estimated 
65 number (e.g., by performing a decoding process that effec-
tively inverts the encoding process). If the key is too long to 
encode in a single data-string transmission, a plurality of 
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such transmissions may be used to convey respective por-
tions of the key, until the complete key has been commu-
nicated. 
30 
authenticity to the verifier device. The verifier device is so 
named because is it responsible for verifying the authenticity 
of the prover device. 
At 1210, digital circuitry of the prover device may gen-In some embodiments, the action of generating the data 
string includes randomly selecting a number (e.g., the value 
of the index ind2 , where the number determines the start 
position of the selected substring within the data string. 
In some embodiments, the action of generating the data 
string may include determining a number by encoding ( or 
perhaps, simply selecting) a non-empty subset of bits from 
a key, where a start position of the selected substring within 
the data string is determined by the number. (Any desired 
encoding scheme may be employed, including the trivial 
encoding that leaves the subset of bits unaltered.) The search 
process may provide an estimate of the number. Thus, the 
method 1000 may also include recovering the non-empty 
subset of bits of the key from the estimate of the number. 
5 erate a data string by: (a) submitting a challenge to a 
physical unclonable function to obtain a response string, (b) 
selecting a substring of predetermined length from the 
response string, ( c) injecting the selected substring into the 
data string, and (d) injecting random bits into bit positions 
10 
of the data string not assigned to the selected substring. 
The physical unclonable function (PUF) may be realized 
as variously described above. It is typically preferably for 
the PUF to be a strong PUF. In some embodiments, the PUF 
15 is an arbiter linear PUF or an XOR-mixed combination of 
In one set of embodiments, a system 1100 for verifying 
authenticity of a communicating party may include a 20 
receiver 1110 and digital circuitry 1115, e.g., as shown in 
FIG. 11. (The system 1100 may also include any subset of 
the features, elements and embodiments described above.) 
The receiver 1110 may be configured to receive a data 
string from the communicating party, e.g., via a communi- 25 
cation medium 1120. The data string may be generated by 
the communicating party by (a) submitting a challenge to a 
physical unclonable function to obtain a response string, (b) 
selecting a substring of predetermined length from the 
response string, ( c) injecting the selected substring into the 30 
data string, and (d) injecting random bits into bit positions 
of the data string not assigned to the selected substring. 
The communication medium 1120 may include any 
desired physical medium or combination of physical media 35 
for the communication of information. In some embodi-
ments, the communication medium may include a computer 
network such as the Internet. 
linear arbiter PUFs. 
At 1215, a transmitter of the prover device may transmit 
the data string to the verifier device through a communica-
tion medium. As variously described above, the position of 
the selected substring within the response string and the 
position of the selected substring within the data string are 
secrets, not revealed by the prover device. Thus, even if a 
dishonest party is able to gain access to a large number of the 
transmitted data strings (e.g., by monitoring the communi-
cation medium over a period of time), it will have great 
difficulty reverse-engineering the physical unclonable func-
tion, i.e., determining a usefully-accurate model of the 
functional relationship between challenge and response of 
the physical unclonable function. 
In some embodiments, the action of selecting a substring 
of predetermined length from the response string includes 
randomly selecting a number, where a start position of the 
substring within the response string is determined by the 
randomly selected number. 
In some embodiments, the action of selecting a substring 
of predetermined length from the response string includes 
determining a number by encoding ( or perhaps, simply 
selecting) a non-empty subset of bits from a key, where a 
start position of the substring within the response string is The digital circuitry 1115 may be configured to: generate 
an estimated response string by evaluating a computational 
model of the physical unclonable function based on the 
challenge; and perform a search process to identify the 
selected substring within the data string using the estimated 
40 determined by the number. 
response string. 
The digital circuitry 1115 may be further configured to 45 
determine whether the communicating party is authentic 
based on a measure of similarity between the identified 
selected substring and a corresponding substring of the 
estimated response string, e.g., as variously described above. 
In some embodiments, the digital circuitry 1115 includes 50 
one or more of the following: a processor operating under 
the control of stored program instructions; one or more 
programmable hardware devices; one or more application-
specific integrated circuits. 
In some embodiments, the action 1210 of generating the 
data string includes randomly selecting a number, where the 
number determines a start position of the selected substring 
within the data string. 
In some embodiments, the action 1210 of generating the 
data string includes determining a number by encoding ( or 
perhaps, simply selecting) a non-empty subset of bits from 
a key, where a start position of the selected substring within 
the data string is determined by the number. 
In one set of embodiments, a prover system 1300 may 
include digital circuitry 1310 and a transmitter 1320, e.g., as 
shown in FIG. 13. (The prover system 1300 may also 
include any subset of the features, elements and embodi-
ments described above.) 
The digital circuitry 1310 may be configured to generate 
a data string by: (a) submitting a challenge to a physical 
unclonable function to obtain a response string, (b) selecting 
a substring of predetermined length from the response 
string, and ( c) injecting the selected substring into the data 
In some embodiments, the system 1100 may also include 55 
a transmitter, e.g., combined with the receiver in a trans-
ceiver unit. Thus, the system 1110 may engage in two-way 
communication with the communicating party. The trans-
mitter and/or receiver may be realized using of a wide 
variety of existing technologies. 60 string, and (d) injecting random bits into bit positions of the 
data string not assigned to the selected substring. The 
physical unclonable function may be configured as variously 
described above. 
In one set of embodiments, a method 1200 may involve 
the operations shown in FIG. 12. (The method 1200 may 
also include any subset of the features, elements and 
embodiments described above.) The method 1200 may be 
used for operating a prover device so that a verifier device 
is enabled to authenticate the prover device. The prover 
device is so named because it is attempting to prove its 
The transmitter 1320 may be configured to transmit the 
65 data string to a verifier system through a communication 
medium 1325. The transmitter may be realized using any of 
a wide variety of conventional transmitter technologies. 
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In some embodiments, the digital circuitry 1310 includes 
one or more of the following: a processor operating under 
the control of stored program instructions; one or more 
programmable hardware devices; one or more application-
specific integrated circuits. 5 
The prover system 1300 has access to the physical 
unclonable function so that it can submit challenges to and 
receive responses from the physical unclonable function. In 
some embodiments, the physical unclonable function is 
included as part of the prover system. 10 
In some embodiments, the physical unclonable function 
includes one or more arbiter linear PUFs, e.g., as variously 
described above. 
In some embodiments, a verifier system is configured to 
authenticate the prover system based on the data string, the 15 
challenge, and a computational model of the physical 
unclonable function, e.g., as variously described above. 
Although the embodiments above have been described in 
considerable detail, numerous variations and modifications 
will become apparent to those skilled in the art once the 20 
above disclosure is fully appreciated. It is intended that the 
following claims be interpreted to embrace all such varia-
tions and modifications. 
What is claimed is: 25 
1. A method for operating a device to verify the authen-
ticity of a communicating party, the method comprising: 
receiving a data string from the communicating party, 
wherein the data string is generated by the communi-
cating party by: 30 
(a) submitting a challenge to a physical unclonable 
function to obtain a response string, 
(b) selecting a substring of predetermined length from 
the response string, 
( c) injecting the selected substring onto a continuous 35 
range of bit positions within the data string, wherein 
a start position of the selected substring within the 
data string is determined by a variable number that is 
not communicated to said device, and 
( d) injecting random bits into bit positions of the data 40 
string not assigned to the selected substring, wherein 
said generating the data string also includes ran-
domly selecting the variable number; 
generating an estimated response string by evaluating a 
computational model of the physical unclonable func- 45 
tion based on the challenge; 
performing a search process to identify the selected 
substring within the data string using the estimated 
response string; 
determining whether the communicating party is authen- 50 
tic based on a measure of similarity between the 
identified selected substring and a corresponding sub-
string of the estimated response string, wherein said 
generating, said performing and said determining are 
performed by digital circuitry. 55 
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the search process is 
a maximum-sequence alignment algorithm. 
3. The method of claim 1, wherein said selecting a 
substring of predetermined length from the response string 
includes: 60 
determining a start number by encoding a non-empty 
subset of bits from a cryptographic key, wherein a start 
position of the sub string within the response string is 
determined by the start number. 
4. The method of claim 3, wherein said search process 65 
provides an estimate of the start number, wherein the method 
further comprises: 
32 
recovering the non-empty subset of bits of the crypto-
graphic key from the estimate of the start number. 
5. The method of claim 1, wherein said randomly select-
ing the variable number includes: 
determining the variable number by encoding a non-
empty subset of bits from a cryptographic key. 
6. The method of claim 5, wherein said search process 
provides an estimate of the number, wherein the method 
further comprises: 
recovering the non-empty subset of bits of the crypto-
graphic key from the estimate of the number. 
7. A system for verifying authenticity of a communicating 
party, the system comprising: 
a receiver configured to receive a data string from the 
communicating party, wherein the data string is gen-
erated by the communicating party by: 
(a) submitting a challenge to a physical unclonable 
function to obtain a response string, 
(b) selecting a substring of predetermined length from 
the response string, 
( c) injecting the selected substring onto a continuous 
range of bit positions within the data string, wherein 
a start position of the selected substring within the 
data string is determined by a variable number that is 
not communicated to said receiver, and 
( d) injecting random bits into bit positions of the data 
string not assigned to the selected substring, wherein 
said generating the data string also includes ran-
domly selecting the variable number; 
digital circuitry configured to: 
generate an estimated response string by evaluating a 
computational model of the physical unclonable 
function based on the challenge; 
perform a search process to identify the selected sub-
string within the data string using the estimated 
response string; 
determine whether the communicating party is authen-
tic based on a measure of similarity between the 
identified selected substring and a corresponding 
substring of the estimated response string. 
8. The system of claim 7, wherein the digital circuitry 
comprises one or more of the following: 
a processor operating under the control of stored program 
instructions; 
one or more programmable hardware devices; 
one or more application-specific integrated circuits. 
9. A method for operating a first device so that a second 
device is enabled to authenticate the first device, the method 
comprising: 
generating a data string by: 
(a) submitting a challenge to a physical unclonable 
function to obtain a response string, 
(b) selecting a substring of predetermined length from 
the response string, 
( c) injecting the selected substring onto a continuous 
range of bit positions within the data string, wherein 
a start position of the selected substring within the 
data string is determined by a variable number that is 
not communicated to said second device, and 
( d) injecting random bits into bit positions of the data 
string not assigned to the selected substring, wherein 
said generating the data string also includes ran-
domly selecting the variable number; and 
transmitting the data string to the second device through 
a communication medium, wherein the data string is 
usable by the second device to authenticate the first 
device. 
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10. The method of claim 9, wherein said selecting a 
substring of predetermined length from the response string 
includes: 
randomly selecting a start number, wherein a start posi-
tion of the substring within the response string is 5 
determined by the start number. 
11. The method of claim 9, wherein said selecting a 
substring of predetermined length from the response string 
includes: 
determining a start number by encoding a non-empty 10 
subset of bits from a cryptographic key, wherein a start 
position of the sub string within the response string is 
determined by the start number. 
12. The method of claim 9, wherein said randomly 
selecting the variable number includes: 15 
determining the variable number by encoding a non-
empty subset of bits from a cryptographic key. 
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data string is determined by a variable number that is 
not communicated to a verifier system, and 
( d) injecting random bits into bit positions of the data 
string not assigned to the selected substring, wherein 
said generating the data string also includes ran-
domly selecting the variable number; and 
a transmitter configured to transmit the data string to the 
verifier system through a communication medium, 
wherein the data string is usable by the verifier system 
to authenticate the prover system. 
14. The prover system of claim 13, wherein the digital 
circuitry comprises one or more of the following: 
a processor operating under the control of stored program 
instructions; 
one or more programmable hardware devices; 
one or more application-specific integrated circuits. 
15. The prover system of claim 13, further comprising: 
the physical unclonable function. 13. A prover system comprising: 
digital circuitry configured to generate a data string by: 
(a) submitting a challenge to a physical unclonable 
function to obtain a response string, 
16. The prover system of claim 13, wherein the physical 
20 unclonable function includes one or more arbiter linear 
physical unclonable functions. 
(b) selecting a substring of predetermined length from 
the response string, 
( c) injecting the selected substring onto a continuous 
range of bit positions within the data string, wherein 
a start position of the selected substring within the 
17. The prover system of claim 13, wherein the verifier 
system is configured to authenticate the prover system based 
on the data string, the challenge, and a computational model 
25 of the physical unclonable function. 
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